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SITUATION

II

FORCE SHORT OF WAR: BLOCKADE AND
OCCUPATION IN TIM.E OF PEACE
There are strained relations between states M
and N. .Armed land and naval forces of state N
enter the jurisdiction of state M without declaration of war and there claim the rights to which a
military occupant would be entitled. In state M,
states S and T, by virtue of treaty agreement with
state M, have special rights in respect to exemption
of persons and property from local jurisdiction.
State N announces a pacific blockade of the coasts
and ports of state M.
(a) In its regular voyage the Safa, a freighter
la\vfully flying the flag of state S, with a cargo of
munitions, is about to enter port 0 of state M
when summoned by radio from an aircraft to lie
to for 24 hours or until a cruiser of state N arrives
to visit and search the Safa. The Safa asks aid
and instructions from the Sogu, a vessel of war of
state S \vhich is in port. What action should the
commander of the Sogtt take~
(b) .A commercial aircraft, the T-21, registered
in state T, is on the following day, when entering
port 0, ordered by the N oan, a cruiser of state N,
to land at a nearby airport, which is in the control
of forces of N, in order that its identity and right
to pass may be established. The T-21 continues
its flight toward port 0 and is fired upon by the
N oan and damaged so that it is obliged to land on
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the beach near the Taf~t, a cruiser of state T. The
Noa?L continues to fire upon the T-21. What action should the co1nmander of the Taf~t take~
(c) Under the treaty, the consul of state T has
con1plete jurisdiction over nationals of state T
at 1\iount, a city of state M up a river and 150
n1iles from the coast. Later the Taf~t anchors off
nfount. The la11d and air forces of state N seize
the city and order two nationals of state T, accused
of a crime against citizens of state nf to be turned
over to authorities of N for trial. The consul of
state T dema11ds that they be turned over to him,
and whe11 the allthorities of N demand the two nationals fro111 state l\1:, the consul requests the aid of
the commander of the Tafu in obtaining and trying
the accused. What action should the comn1ander
of the Taf~t tal{e ~
SOLUTION

(a) If the airplane is still with the Safa, the
commander of the Sog~t shotlld direct the Safa to
lie to, should proceed to the Safa to protect it, and
should notify the con1mander of the N forces that
the Safa is a vessel of state S a11d is not to be
molested, identificatio11 bei11g all that the Sa.fa is
legally required to furnish the airplane. If the
airplane has left the Safa, the Sog~t should direct
the latter to proceed into the port, and, if deemed
essential for the protection of the Safa, the Sogu
should accompany it into the port.
(b) The corm11ander of the Taf~t should warn
the N oan that if the latter continues to fire upon
the T-21, he will fire llpon the N oa1~ to force it to
desist. He should attempt to interpose the Taf~t
bet,veen the l\7oan and the airplane with the object
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of halting the firing and should send out a small
boat to rescue the survivors of the T-21.
(c) The commander of the Taf~t should consult
with the consul of state T at Mount and should
report the incident to his superiors in the Navy
Department. A demand for the return of the nationals of state T or a threat of the use of force on
the part of the commander of the Tafu would not
be warranted by the facts of this situation. As
long as no immediate threat to the lives and prop·e rty of state T nationals is involved, the matter is
one for diplomatic negotiation between states T
andN.
NOTES

(( Strai1~ed relatio1ts. ))-The strained relations between states 1\ti and N do not constitllte a state of
war. War in the legal sense depends for its exist€nce not merely upon the presence of an armed
clash (the objective criterion of 'var) but also upo11
the intent either of one of the parties to the clash
or upon the intent of a third party or l)arties ( t~e
~ubjective criterion). In the past, at least, 'var in
the legal sense has been a status resulting from
some sort of a blend of these two criteria, although
it is to be remembered that legal war may exist
without the use of force and that all use .of force
is not war. The anomalies of this situation have
been so great and definition of 'var has become so
elusive, that strong suggestions are being made
€ither to eliminate war entirely from the vocabulary of international law, or to make war in the
legal sense practically synonymous with the use of
force. In the present situation, however, it is plain
that though there is an armed clash between states
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a11d N there is no war. There is no question,
therefore, of belligerent rights or of neutral rights
~n the strict legal sense. The situation is obviously
analogous to the Sino-Japanese conflict which
began i11 1937.
N at~tre of the Si1'Lo-J apanese clash.1\Iay the present extensive military operations of Japanese
forces on Chinese soil be explained on the gTound of war ~
No declaration of war has been made by either side in the
conflict, although the Hague Convention o:f 1907, to which
China and Japan are parties, provides that hostilities should
not commence without previous and explicit warning to the
other party and notice to neutral Powers. The exercise of
belligerent rights of blockade, visit, search and capture have
not been resorted to by either side. Diplomatic relations
have not been broken off although the heads of missions retired after the fall of Nanking. Consuls generally remain
at their posts and commercial intercourse has continued, although naturally on a much reduced scale. On the other
hand, extensive military operations have been in progress
between the Japanese and Chinese armies since early July,
1937. Something like a million troops are said to be engaged
on both sides, and something over thirty-five warships have
taken part in the operations. Bombardments by warships,
heavy artillery and 'var planes have been extensive and destructive to life and property. As early as August 25 Admiral Hasegawa declared a blockade of certain Chinese coasts
against Chinese vessels, and Chinese vessels running the
blockade have been captured and sunk. Provisional governments in the nature of military governments supported by
armed forces have been set up by Japan in the conquered
territory. Neutrals have been warned to withdraw from
areas of hostilities, and encroachments have been made by
Japanese forces upon the foreign settlement areas. (L. H.
'Voolsey, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32,
p. 317.)

Report of the Ni1Le Power B1·ussels Co1tfere1Lce.-Follo\ving is the text of the report adopted
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on November 24, 1937, by the Nine Power Conference at Brussels', Belgium:
"The Conference at Brussels 'vas assembled pursuant to
an invitation extended by the Belgian Government at the
request of His ~1ajesty's Government in the United Kingdom with the approval of the American Government. It
held its opening session on November 3, 1937. The Conference has now reached a point at which it appears desirable
to record the essential phases of its work.
"In the winter of 1921-22 there were signed at \Vashington a group of inter related treaties and agreements of
which the Nine Power Treaty regarding principles and
policies to be followed in matters concerning China constituted one of the most in1portant units. These treaties and
agreements were the result of careful deliberation and were
entered into freely. They were designed primarily to bring
about conditions of stability and security in the Pacific area.
"The Nine Po,ver Treaty stipulates in Article one that" 'The Contracting Powers, other than China agree :
" ' ( 1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and
the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
" ' ( 2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed
opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself
an effective and stable government;
"' (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the princi pie of equal
opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations
throughout the territory of China;
" ' (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in
China in order to seek special rights or privileges which
would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly
States, and fro1n countenancing action inimical to the security of such States.'
"Under and in the light of these undertakings and of the
provisions contained in the other treaties, the situation in
the Pacific area was for a decade characterized by a substantial measure of stability, with considerable progress
towards the other objectives envisaged in the treaties. In
recent years there have come a series of conflicts between
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Japan and China, and these conflicts have culminated in the
hostilities now in progress.
"The Conference at Brussels was called for the purpose,
as set forth in the terms of the invitation 'of examining in
conformity "rith Article seven of that treaty, the situation
in the Far East and of studying peaceable means of hastening an end of the regrettable conflict which prevails there.'
'Vith the exception of Japan, all of the signatories and adherents to the Nine Po,ver Treaty of February 6, 1922 accepted the invitation and sent representatives to Brussels
for the purpose stated in the invitation.
"The Chinese Government, attending the Conference and
participating in its deliberations, has communicated with the
other parties to the Nine Power Treaty in conformity 'vith
Article 7 of that treaty. It has stated here that its present
1nilitary operations are purely in resistance to armed invasion of China by Japan. It has declared its 'villingness
to accept a peace based upon the principles of the Nine
Po,ver Treaty and to collaborate 'vholeheartedly with the
other powers in support o£ the principle of the sanctity of
treaties.
"The Japanese Government in replying with regret that
it 'Yas not able to accept the invitation to the Conference
affirmed that 'the action of Japan in China is a measure
of self defense 'vhich she has been compelled to take in the
face of China's fierce anti Japanese policy and practice and
especially by her provocative action in resorting to force of
arms; and consequently it lies, as has been declared already
by the Imperial Government, outside the purvie'v of the
Nine Po"·er Treaty'; and advanced the vie'v that an attempt
to seek a solution at a gathering of so many powers 'would
only serve to complicate the situation still further and to
put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper
solution'.
"On November 7, 1937 the Conference sent through the
Belgian Government to the Japanese Government a comm,unication in the course of 'vhich the Conference inquired
'vhether the Japanese Government would be willing to depute a representative or representatives to exchange views
with representatives of a small number of po"Ters to be
chosen for that purpose, the exchange of vie,vs to take place
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within the framework of the Nine Po,ver Treaty and in confornlity with the provisions of that treaty, toward throwing
further light on points of difference and facilitating a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict. In that communication
the representatives of the states met at Brussels, expressed
their earnest desire that peaceful settlement be achieved.
"To that communication the Japanese Government replied
in a communication of November 12, 1937 stating that it
could not do otherwise than maintain its previously expressed point of view that the present action of Japan in
her relations with China was a measure of self defense and
did not come within the scope of the Nine Power Treaty;
that only an effort between the two parties would constitute
a means of securing the most just and the most equitable
settlement, and that the intervention of a collective organ
such as the Conference would merely excite public opinion
in the two countries and make it more difficult to reach a
solution satisfactory to all.
"On November 15 the Conference adopted a declaration
in the course of which it affirmed that the representatives
of the Union of South Africa, the United States of America,
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, China, France, the
United Kingdom, India, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
'* * * consider this conflict of concern in fact to all
countries party to the Nine Power Treaty of Washington
of 1922 and to all countries party to the Pact of Paris of
1928 and of concern in fact to all countries members of
the family of nations.'
"In the presence of this difference between the views of
the Conference and of the Japanese Government there now
appears to be no opportunity at this time for the Conference to carry out its terms of reference insofar as they relate
to entering into discussions with Japan towards bringing
about peace by agreement. The Conference therefore is
concluding this phase of its work and at this moment of
going into recess adopts a further declaration of its views.
"The text of the communication sent to the Japanese
Government on November 7, 1937 reads as follows:
" 'The representatives of the states met in Brussels on
November 3, last, have taken cognizance of the reply which
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the Japanese Governn1ent sent in of October 27 to the invitation of the Belgian Government, and the statement
which accompanied this reply.
" 'In these documents the I1nperial Government states that
it cherishes no territorial ambitions in respect of China and
that on the contrary it sincerely desires "to assist in the
1naterial and moral development of the Chinese nation",
that it also desires "to promote cultural and economic cooperation" 'vith the foreign powers in China and that it
intends furthermore scrupulously "to respect foreign rights
and interest in that country."
" 'The points referred to in this declaration are among the
fundamental principles of the Treaty of Washington of
February 6, 1922 (The Nine Power Treaty). The representatives of the states parties to this treaty have taken note
of the declarations of the Imperial Government in this
· respect.
" 'The Imperial Government moreover denies that there
can be any question of a violation of the Nine Power Treaty
by Japan and it :formulates a number o:f complaints against
the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government for its
part contends that there has been violation, denies the
charges of the Japanese Government and, in turn, makes
complaint against Japan.
"'The treaty has made provision :for just such a situation.
It should be borne in mind that the exchange of views taking place in Brussels is based essentially on these provisions
and constitutes "full and frank communication" as envisaged in Article VII. This Conference is being held with a
view to assisting in the resolving by peaceful means of a
conflict btween parties to the treaty.
" 'One of the parties to the present conflict, China, is represented at the Conference and has affirmed its willingness
:fully to cooperate in its work.
"'The Conference regrets the absence of the other party,
Japan, 'vhose cooperation is most desirable.
" 'The Imperial Government states that it is "firmly convinced that an attempt to seek a solution at a gathering of
so many powers whose interests in East Asia are of varying
degree, or who have practically no interests there at all,
'viii only serve to complicate the situation still further and
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to put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper
solution."
" 'It should be pointed out that all of these powers which
are parties to the treaty are, under the terms of this in-strument, entitled to exercise the rights which the treaty
confers upon then1 ; that all powers which have interests in
the Far East are concerned regarding the present hostilities;
-and that the whole world is solicitous with regard to the
effect of these hostilities on the peace and security of the
members of the family of nations.
" 'However, the representatives of the states met at Brussels believe that it may be possible to allay Japan's misgivings referred to above; they would be glad to know
whether the Imperial Government would be disposed to depute a representative or representatives to exchange views
with representatives of a small number of powers to be
.chosen for that purpose. Such an exchange of views would
take place within the framework of the Nine Power Treaty
and in conformity with the provisions of that treaty. Its
aims would be to throw further light on the various points
referred to above and to facilitate a settlen1ent of the con-flict. Regretting the continuation of hostilities, being
firmly convinced that a peaceful settlement is alone capable
of insuring a lasting and constructive solution of the present conflict, and having confidence in the efficacy of methods
Df conciliation, the representatives of the states met at
Brussels earnestly desire that such a settlement may be
achieved.
"'The states represented at the Conference would be very
glad to know as soon as possible the attitude of the Imperial
Government towards this proposal.'
"The text of the declaration adopted by the Conference
November 24, 1937 reads as follows :
"'The Nine Power Treaty is a conspicuous example of
numerous international instruments by which the nations
of the world enunciate certain principles and accept certain
self denunciatory rules in their conduct with each other
solemnly undertaking to respect the sovereignty of other
nations, to refrain from seeking political or economic domination of other nations, and to abstain from interference in
their internal affairs.
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" 'These international instruments constitute a fra1nework
within '-vhich international security and international peace
are intended to be safeguarded without resort to arms and
within 'vhich international relationships should subsist on
the basis of n1utual trust, good will and beneficial trade and
financial relations.
" 'It must be recognized that whenever armed force is
employed in disregard of these principles the whole structure of international relations based upon the safeguards
provided by treaties is disturbed. Nations are then compelled to seek security in ever increasing arn1a1nents.
There is created everywhere a feeling of uncertainty and
insecurity. The validity of these principles cannot be
destroyed by force, their universal applicability cannot be
denied and indispensability to civilization and progress
cannot be gainsaid.
" 'It 'vas in accordance 'vith these principles that this
Conference was called in Brussels for the purpose, as set
forth in the terms of the invitation issued by the Belgian
Government "of examining in conformity with article seven
of the Nine Po,ver Treaty, the situation in the Far East and
of studying peaceable 1neans of hastening an end of the
regrettable conflict which prevails there".
" 'Since its opening session on November 3rd the Conference has continuously striven to promote conciliation and
has endeavored to secure the cooperation of the Japanese
Government in the hope of arresting hostilities and bringing about a settlement.
" 'The Conference is convinced that force cannot provide
just and lasting solution for disputes between nations. It
continues to believe that it would be to the i1nmediate and the
ultimate interest of both parties to the present dispute to
a vail themscl Yes of the assistance of others in an effort to
bring hostilities to an early end as a necessary preli1ninary
to the achievement of a general and lasting settlement. It
further believes that a satisfactory sett1ement cannot be
achieved by direct negotiation bet,-veen the parties to the
conflict alone and that only by consultation 'vith other
po,vers principally concerned can there be achieved an
agreement the terms of which will be just, generally acceptable and likely to endure.
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"'This Conference strongly reaffirms the principles of the
Nine Power Treaty as being among the basic principles
which are essential to world peace and orderly progressive
development of national and international life.
"'The Conference believes that a prompt suspension of
hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests not
only of China and Japan but of all nations. With each
day's continuance of the conflict the loss in lives and property increases and the ultimate solution of the conflict beeoines Inore difficult.
" 'The Conferenec therefore strongly urges that hostilities
be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes.
" 'The Conference believes that no possible step to bring
about by peaceful processes a just settlement of the conflict
should be overlooked or omitted.
" 'In order to allow time for participating governments
to exchange views and further explore all peaceful methods
by which a just settlement of the dispute may be attained
consistently 'vith the principles of the Nine Power Treaty
and in conformity with the objectives of that treaty the
Conference deems it advisable temporarily to suspend its
sittings. The conflict in the Far East remains, however, a
matter of concern to all the powers assembled at Brusselsby virtue of co1nmitments in the Nine Power Treaty or of
.s pecial interest in the Far East-and especially to those
most inunediately and directly affected by conditions and
.events in the Far East. Those of them that are parties to
the Nine Po"Ter Treaty have expressly adopted a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East and, to that
end, are bound by the provisions of that treaty, outstanding
.among w·hich are those of articles 1 and 7.
" 'The Conference will be called together again whenever
i.ts chair1nan or any t.'vo of its members shall have reported
that they consider that its deliberations can be ad vantageously resumed.' "
Both China and Italy requested that statements of position they made should be considered as integral parts of the
report. (Press Releases, Vol. XVII, No. 426.)
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Policy of the

Ur~ited

States-GeneTal.-

At his press conference on August _17, 1937 the Secretary
of State announced that (1) legislative action to n1ake available funds for purposes of emergency relief necessitated by
the situation in the Far East had been asked and that (2)
this Govern1nent had given orders for a regiment of marines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. The Secretary
then discussed at some length the principles of policy on
"\vhich this Government "\vas proceeding.
The situation in Shanghai is in many respects unique.
Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population
of over three 1nillion, a port which has been developed by
the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed 1nutually advantageous contacts of all types and
varieties between and among the Chinese and people of
ahnost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai there
exists a multiplicity of rights and interests "\vhich are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United
States.
In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and
safe removal of An1erican citizens from areas "~here there
is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American
Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection,
primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For
that purpose it has for Inany years Inaintained s1nall detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is
sending the present small reinforcement. These armed
forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance to,,ard maintenance of order and
security. It has been the desire and the intention of the
American Govern1nent to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called
for. and such remains its desire and expectation.
The issues and proble1ns which are of concern to this
Govern1nent in the present situation in the Pacific area go
far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of
the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected
·with and have a direct and fundan1ental relationship to the
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general principles of policy to which attention 'vas called
in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked
expressions of approval from more than 50 governments.
This Government is firmly of the opinion that the principle
summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships.
When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world
the threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter
is of concern to all nations. 'Vithout attempting to pass
judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal
to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that
they settle their differences in accordance with principles
which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most
peoples of the world, should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world,
in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in
the statement of July 16. That statement of princples is
comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington Conference treaties and the I\::ellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.
From the beginning of the present controversy in the
Far East, 've have been urging upon both the Chinese and
the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining
from hostilities and of maintaining peace. vVe have been
participating constantly in consultation with interested
governn1ents directed toward peaceful adjustment. This
Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does
believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achieven1ent of those objeetives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of
our ''ell-defined attitude and policies, and "rithin the range
thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention
to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, to,vard safeguarding the lives or welfare of our people and making
effective the policies-especially the policy of peace-in
which this country believes and to which it is committed.
This Government is endeavoring to see kept alive,
strengthened, and revitalized, in reference to the Pacific
area and to all the world, these fundan1ental princi pies.
(Press Releases, Vol. XVII, No. 413.)
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Self-help and strai1~ed relatio1~s-Reprisals.
The use of force 'vithout \var is legal but few crystallized rules exist to govern the relations of the
combatants and the relatio11s bet,veen these and
third states. In theory, due to the absence of an
organized international gover11111ent with the power
to enforce law, states have been legally justified in
taking the law into their O\Vn hands and e1nploying
force for the defense of their rights. This is the
system (or lack of system) kno\vn as Self-Help.
According to the theory there is a \vell defined set
of rigl1ts and duties belongli1g to the members of
the inter11ational com111unity; these members, in the
absence of international agencies, are to decide
what their rigl1ts and duties are and are authorized to apply measures of coercion i11 the execution
of the la\v. If all states were n1ore or less equal,
this system might operate in line with the theory,
but in l)ractice, because of the vast i11equalities between the strengths of various nations, it has led
to grave abuses, and what should have been legal
n1easures of law enforcement turn otlt to be in fact
mea11s for political domination and control by the
stronger against the weal{er. The virtual collapse
of the theory in operation is due 11ot only to state
inequality but also to the fact that each state has
bee11 its own prosecutor, judge and enforcing agent.
The la\v on this subject of Self-Help is therefore
\Voefully deficient. It has had to trail alo11g after
the practice of the great powers tidying up in haphazard fashion the actions of strong states \Vhich
have claimed to be enforcing their legal rights and
\Vl1ich have not been called to account except belatedly by relatively fe\v publicists and students.
Judges and la\v interpretators for the 111ost part
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have accepted the fact of the use of force because
of necessity and have thus built up a certain
amount of pragmatic law based 1nainly on the de
facto use of power a11d not on the basis of the genuii1e mutual self-interest of states in general.
Probably the most commo11 a11d general term for
these measures of Self-Help which do not involve
war, is that of reprisal, though it is to be remembered that 'var itself is often justified as the ultiIna te reprisal. Theoretically, a reprisal is a legal
act of redress performed by a state to obtain satisfaction for an injury received. Force is 110t justified legally unless there has been a refusal to make
redress after dtle notice. .As above indicated, however, these allegedly lega~ measures are usually
highly colored by political motives and objectives,
so that while a great state has'' justified'' a reprisal
upon the grounds of self-help, actually the venture
has most ofte11 been of very dubious legality, the
· la'v serving chiefly as a thin veneer to cover what
in essence was an illegal act.
Reprisals n1ay take several forms, such as military occupation, naval bombardment, attacks upon
co1nmerce, en1bargo, boycott, and pacific blockade.
The history of reprisals and an analysis of their
employment are admirably described in Hindn1arsh, A. E. ''Force in Peace.'' The sanctions outlined in Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant are designed to be collective reprisals, and to
be of a legal rather than a political nature, in that
they were to be employed by a community agency
after a careful study. Some of these pl"oblems
'vere thoroughly studied in the Naval War College
Situations in 1932, pages 89 to 135.
1675R3-40-5
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Pacific blockade.-The United States has C011sistently denied tl1e legality of interference with
vessels of third states by a squadron applying a
pacific blocl{ade. .As there is no war and therefore
no belligere11t rights, legally there can be no visit
and search, but a blockading vessel has the right to
identify ships attempting to pass the blockade.
It may be necessary that the blockading forces approach,
'vitl1in the specific area of effective 1naintenance of the blockade, vessels of third states, for the purpose of verification of
their right to fly the flag. (Naval \¥ar College Situations,
1932, p. 95.)

Pacific bla.ckade
~1ore

i1~

the

Si1~o-Japa1~ese

conflict.-

important than these subsidiary operations was
the navy's part in hindering the replenishn1ent fron1 abroad
of Chinese stocks of n1ilitary equipn1ent. A "pacific blockade"-proclaimed on August _25 by the commander of the
Japanese China fleet-for territory bet,veen the mouth of
the Yangtze and S".,.ato'v 'vas extended on September 5 to
include virtually the entire Chinese coast, from the Manchurian border to Pakhoi in the south. Since Japan, not
being legally at war, did not possess the right of a belligerent to intercept shipn1ents of contraband in neutral
ships, the blockade 'vas directed against Chinese vessels
alone. \Vhile a naval spokes1nan at Shanghai threatened
to pree1npt such cargoes if carried in non-Chinese craft~
1,okyo declared that the "peaceful commerce" of third po'vers would not be molested. This term, ho,vever, was not
construed to cover foreign vessels specifically employed for
the purpose of carrying 'var supplies to the Chinese. Apparently reluctant to challenge the doubtful legality of this
exception, both the United States and Great Britain took
1neasures to avoid incidents in the blockaded zone. British
shipping 'vas advised that, in the absence of a British warship, Japanese naval officers should be permitted to board
ship and verify certificates of registry-a procedure which
'vould tend to prevent use of the British flag as a ruse by
Chinese Yessels. Once foreign countries had acquiesced to
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this extent in the Japanese procedure, Tokyo authorities
let it be known that "for the present" there would be no
interference ·with any foreign shipping. This course was
probably adopted because it was believed that the volume
of military supplies shipped by sea to China, after these
government warnings, would be too small to warrant the
risk of foreign complications over their seizure. (Foreign
Policy Reports, l\fay 15, 1938, p. 55.)

Following a conference with the Secretary of State and
the Chairman of the United States l\1aritime Commission,
the President today, Septe1nber 14, 1937, issued the follov.-"ing state1nent:
"~ierchant vessels o"~ned by the Govern1nent of the U nitecl
States 'vill not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted
to transport to China or Japan any of the arn1s, ammunition, or implements of "\Yar 'vhich were listed in the President's prochunation of l\fay 1, 1937.
"Any other 1nerchant vessels, flying the A1nerican flag,
"~hich atten1pt to transport any of the listed articles to
China or Japan ""'ill, until further notice, do so at their
ow·n risk.
"The question of applying the Neutrality Act re1nan1s
in statu quo, the Government policy remaining on a 24hour basis."
ANNOUNCHMENT

The conflict in the Far East has resulted in the creation
of a danger zone along the coast of China which makes it
dangerous for American merchant vessels to operate in the
adjacent waters.
The Japanese authorities have announced a blockade of
the entire coast from Chin,vangtao to Pakhoi against the
entrance or egress of Chinese shipping.
The Chinese authorities have announced their intention,
in view of the blockade, to take appropriate action against
all Japanese naval vessels along the Chinese coast and
have requested that naval and merchant vessels of third
pnwers avoid proxi1nity to ,Japanese naval vessels nnd 1nili-
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tary transports and have their respective national colors
painted on their top decks in a conspicuous 1nanner.
The Chinese authorities have also announced the follo,ving:
(a) The n1outh of ~fin J(iang River in Fukien Province
has been closed to navigation, and all shipping through that
place has been suspended as of Septe1nber 4.
(b) Beginning ·Septe1nber 9 no foreign 1nerchant vessels
'vill be pern1itted to navigate at night in 'vaters between
Bocca Tigris forts and Canton. (Press Releases,
ol.
X'TII, No. 416.)

'T

The international law gover1~·i1~g rezJrisalsFour general rules.-Tl1e rules gover11ing the conduct of reprisals and the relations bet\veen the contestants and third states have never bee11 clearly
developed, reprisals constituting an extremely
foggy segment of international la\v. Ollt of the
practice of reprisals both before 1914 and in these
later days of ''undeclared \vars, '' certain general
rules, ho\vever, do emerge. These are shadovvy, it
is true, and their listing is not in the least 111eant to
be definitive. Four, hovvever, can be discerned:
(1) The state engaging in reprisals is entitled to
take those measures which are reasonably related
to the end in vievv, and vvhich do not interfere linreasonably vvith the rights of third states in \vhat,
~fter all, is still technically a state of peace. The
meaning of the word ''reasonable'' is subject to
legal determination. The law or the judge applying the law 1nust talre into account the fact that
the state engaged in a reprisal partaking of the
nature of force USllally l1as a definite military or
naval objective. Tl1ose acts \vhich are connected
with tl1e attainment of this end must be condoned
by third states to a certain exte11t; these latter must
be I)repared to permit son1e interfere11ce vvi th their
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normal peace tin1e rights, and though they do not
have to allo'v the exercise of belligei-.ent rights, they
must recognize some modification in the regular
la,vs of peace. This principle may seem vague and
abstract, but in concrete situations it is not too difficult to apply, for in these it is usually not impossible to make a compromise which gra11ts the state
applying force sufficient latitude for the attainment of its object but which does not destroy completely the rights of third parties. An exan1ple of
such a compromise is to be found in pacific blockade, where the vessels of third states must identify
themselves to ships of the blockading force. This
adjustment of the needs of the military and naval
forces of the state engaged in reprisals with the
rights of third states is all-important, and its
achievement along the lines of reasonable compromise is of paramount significance in any discussion
of this topic.
(2) Despite the absence of formal agreement on
this 1natter, there has been a distinct trend toward
applying the laws of war to the conduct of hostilities between the parties in these non-war situations.
The states engaged in the dispute are not bellig-"
erents btlt they have come to be regarded as being
to some extent under the laws of belligerency.
Where third states are concei-.ned this means that
the usual war-time doctrine of "military necessity" will be the criterion for the responsibility for
damages committed by either contestant. r In the
Sino-Japanese conflict, for instance, it has been
interesting to note ho'v third powers, though not
admitting the existence of war, have yet attempted
to hold both Japan and China responsible for
injuries as if there were a war. Foreigners' loss
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of life a11d property have brought a den1and for
reparation whe11ever ·such loss has seemed Ullcounected \vith "military necessity~"
(3) Contestants in a non-\var use of force 1nust
therefore pay damages on a \Yar basis, a rule
obviotlsly and immediately related to the one preceding. Sometimes in the past, damages have not
been paid, as in the case of the bombardment of
Greytown in 1854 ( 4 Court of Claims Report 54:-3,
Perri1~ ·v. the U~nited States), but the failure of the
United States in this instance does 11ot constitute
a precedent, for in many other cases payme11t has
bee11 111ade for damages \vhich \vere 11ot tl1e result
of the acutal needs of "'varfare." In his a1·tielP,
''Responsibility for Damages to Persons a11d Property of Aliens in Undeclared War'' (Proceedings
of the American Society of Inter11ational J__;a\Y,
1938, pp. 127 to 140), Professor Clyde E11gleto11
1nal{es a thoroughgoing survey of the precedents 011
this point.
( 4) Because there is no \var in the legal sense,
there is no neutrality during a period of reprisals.
Third states accept inconvenience and interfere11ce,
but they are not called upon to enforce neutral
obligations, nor must they concede the full exercise
of belligerent rights.
This entlmeration of alleged rules may 11ot really
be la\v at all becat1se the status of reprisals is basically so a11omalous. On the one hand, there is
legally peace and on the other, there is the employment of force \Vhich brings many war-like elen1ents
into the troubled pict11re. That the l"esult legally
is considerable confusio11 is not surprising, but a
semblance of order may be mai11tained if reasonable con1pron1ises arc 1nade on the basis of the fore-
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going outline. A stronger international law of
peace and a better organized world of states would
not tolerate such a hazy assemblage of alleged principles based llpon a part-peace, part-war foundation, but for the present all that can be done is to
salvage son1ething in the way of order out of this
unsatisfactory situation.
As above suggested, third parties have attempted
to l1old both Japan and China to the laws of war
during the Far Eastern conflict. Both these powers seem to have admitted responsibility under the
laws of war and have paid damages accordingly.
The most notable instance of this is the case of the
Panay) the full story of which is printed in the appendix to this volume. The Japanese paid the
United States $2,214,007.36 for the sinking of the
Panay (Press Releases, Vol. XVIII, No. 443, p.
410), vvhile the Chinese Government paid the
United States $264,887.47 as indemnification for
perso11al injuries sustained as a result of the bombing of the S. S. P1/0es1~dent Hoover on August 30,
1937. (Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 468, p. 190.)
American attit~tde toward J apa1~ese conduct of
host1~lt:ties.-Since the renewal of the fighting between China and Japan in the Summer of 1937,
the American Governme11t, though never conceding
that a formal war was in progress, has endeavored
to call Japan to account as if the lavvs of war actually governed the situation. The American notes
insist that the principles of the law of war are operative, e. g. in regard to bombing, and that damage or destruction are permissible only when ''The
objectives of Japanese military operations are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and estab-
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lishments. '' (See the next to the last paragraph of
the A1nerica11 note printed immediately belo\v.)
i\Ol\IBING OF NANKING

Upon instructions of the Secretary of State, the American
Ambassador at 'Tokyo, l\Ir. Joseph C. Gre".,., delivered a note
to the l\finister for Foreign Affairs at Tokyo, September 22,
1937. The note read textually as follows:
"1'he American Government refers to the statement by the
commander in chief of the Japanese Third Fleet which was
handed to the American consul General at Shanghai on Septeinber 19 announcing the project of the Japanese Naval Air
Force, after 12 o'clock noon of Septe1nber 21, 1937, to resort to
bombing and other measures of offense in and around the city
of Nanking and 'Yarning the officials and nationals of third
po""'ers living there 'to take adequate 1neasures for voluntary
moving into areas of greater safety.'
"The American Govern1nent objects both to such jeopardizing of the lives of its nationals and of noncombatants generally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals
now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from
the areas in which they are la,vfully carrying on their legitimate activities.
"I1nmediately upon being informed of the announcement
under reference, the A1nerican Government gave instruction
to the American Ambassador at Tokyo to express to the J apanese Government this Government's concern; and that instruction 'vas carried out. On the same day the concern of
this Govern1nent 'vas expressed by the Acting Secretary of
State to the Japanese A1nbassador in "\Vashington.
"This G·overn1nent holds the vie'v that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is un,varranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity. l\foreover, in
the present instance the P..eriod allowed for withdrawal is
inadequate, and, in view of the wide area over which J apanese bombing operations have prevailed, there can be no
assurance that even in areas to which American nationals
and noncombatants might 'vithdraw they would be secure.
"N othwithstanding the reiterated assurance that 'the
safety of the lives and property of nationals of friendly
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powers will be taken into full consideration during the
projected offensive,' this Government is constrained to observe that experience has shown that, when and where aerial
bombing operations are engaged in, no amount of solicitude
on the part of the authorities responsible therefor is effective
toward insuring the safety of any persons or any property
'vithin the area of such operations.
"Reports of bombing operations by Japanese planes at
and around Nanking both before and since the issuance of
the announcement under reference indicate that these operations almost invariably result in extensive destruction of
noncombatant life and nonmilitary establishments.
"In vie·w of the fact that Nanking is the seat of governInent in China and that there the American Ambassador
and other agencies of the American Govern1nent carry on
their essential functions, the American Govern1nent strongly
objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which
the American A1nbassador and other agencies of this Government are confronted with the ·alternative of abandoning
their establish1nents or being exposed to grave hazards.
"In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the
Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military operations are limited strictly to 0 hinese military
agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non1nilitary property and
noncombatants the direct objects of attack, and of the J apanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the
Embassies, warships, and merchant vessels of the powers at
Nanking, the American Government cannot believe that the
intimation that the whole Nanking area m.ay be subjected
to bombing operations represents the considered intent of
the Japanese Government.
"The American Government, therefore, reserving all
rights on its o'vn behalf and on behalf of American Nationals in respect to damages which might result from J apanese military operations in the Nanking area, expresses the
earnest hope that further bombing in and around the city
of .Nanking 'vill be a vioded." (Press Releases, Vol. XVII,
No. 417.)
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property in areas of hostility.-

"I am instructed by my Government to bring to Your Excellency's attention reports and complaints fro1n American
residents that in the course of recent military operations at
Nanking, Hangsho'v and other places the Japanese armed
forces have repeatedly entered American property illegally
and removed goods and employees and committed other acts
of depredation against American property which has almost
invariably been marked by American flags and by notices in
English, Chinese and Japanese issued by the American authorities and setting forth the American character of the
property concerned. According to these reports not only
have Japanese soldiers manifested a complete disregard for
these notices but they have also in numerous instances torn
down, burned and otherwise mutilated American flags. I
a1n directed to impress upon Your Excellency the seriousness with which my Government regards such acts and to
convey its most emphatic protest against them. My Government finds it impossible to reconcile the flagrant disregard
of American rights shown by Japanese troops as above described with the assurances contained in Your Excellency's
note of December 24, 1937, that 'rigid orders have been
issued to the military, naval and Foreign Office authorities
to pay * * * greater attention than hitherto to observance of the instructions that have been repeatedly given
against infringtjment of, or unwarranted interference with,
the rights and interests of the United States and other
third powers.'
"In view of the fact that a number of these acts are reported as having occurred subsequent to the receipt of the
aforementioned assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government and inas1nuch as this disregard of American rights
is reported as still continuing, the American Government ·is
constrained to observe that the steps which the Japanese
Government have so far taken seem inadequate to ensure
that hereafter American nationals, interests and property
in China shall not be subjected to attack by Japanese armed
forces or unlawful interference by any Japanese authorities
or forces 'vhatsoever. l\iy Government must, therefore, request that the Imperial Japanese Government reenforce the
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instructions which have already been issued in such a way
as will serve effectively to prevent the repetition of such
outrages."
(Note presented by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 17, 1938,
Press Releases, Vol. XVIII, No. 435.)

A.rnerican property

occ~tpied

by Japanese.-

The American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Joseph C.
Gre'v, on May 31, 1938, addressed to the Japanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs, under instruction from the Secretary
of State, a note reading as follows :
"The problem of enabling American citizens in China to
reenter and repossess their properties, from which they have
been excluded by the Japanese military and of which the
Japanese military have been and in some cases still are in
occupation, is giving the Government of the United States
.
.
Increasing concern.
"An illustrative case is that of the property of the University of Shanghai, a large and valuable plant located at
Shanghai in the Y angtzepoo district. This university has
been engaged for many years in educational work and is
jointly o'vned by the Northern and Southern Baptist Missionary Societies. The pre1nises of the university have been
under continuous occupation by Japanese military and naval
units since shortly after the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai in August 1937. It is understood that the premises have
been used by the Japanese for quartering troops and for
military offices, and a portion of the campus for stationing
airplanes and supplementing the runway for airplanes on
the adjacent golf course which has been converted by the
Japanese into a military flying field. During the period
of Japanese occupancy several buildings have been damaged
and the n1ajority looted. Japanese occupation of the property has continued for a period of nine months, notwithstanding the fact that hostil-ities in this locality long ago
ceased. Repeated \rritten and oral representations made by
the An1erican En1bassy at Tokyo to the Japanese Govern1nent and by the American Consul General at Shanghai to
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the Japanese authorities there have not so far resulted in
bringing about restoration of the pre1nises to the rightful
o'vners. Recently, representatives of the Baptist missionary
societies have stressed, on behalf of the six 1nillion Baptists
in the United .States, the urgent need £or the return to
their possession of this important 1nissionary educational
property.
~•rn various places in the lo,ver Yangtze 'Talley An1erican
businessmen and 1nissionaries have been prevented by the
Japanese authorities fro1n returning to their places of business and 1nission stations and are denied even casual access
to their properties. rrhe A1nerican Consul General at
Shanghai has made applications for passes in behalf of
several A1nerican fir1ns 'vith in1portant interests in that area
in order to per1nit the representatives and en1ployees of th~
fir1ns to resurne business there, but such applications have
repeatedly been refused by the Japanese authorities on the
ground that peace and order have not been sufficiently restored. .This has been the case even 'vhen the applications
"~ere for visits for the purpose of brief inspection and checking of losses or for the purpose of taking steps to prevent
further deterioration of their properties, including stocks
und equipment, during their enforced absence. ~'!any J apanese n1erchants and their families are kno"·n to be in the
localities to 'vhich these Americans seek to return.
"American missionaries also have been prevented from returning to their stations in the lo·wer Yangtze 'Talley. Certain mission properties in this region 'vhich were for1nerly
under occupation by Japanese troops are no'v reported to
have been vacated as a result of Japanese troop transfers,
and the missionary societies concerned feel it highly iinportant that their representatives reoccupy and preserve such
properties. In view of the fact that Japanese civilians are
freely permitted to go into and reside in such areas-as,
for exan1ple, at Nanking 'vhere son1e eight hundred J apanese nationals, including a substantial number of 'vo1nen
and children, are reported to be in residence-it is difficult
to perceive any 'varrant for the continued placing by the
.T apanese authorities of obstacles in the 'vay of return by
Americans 'vho have legitimate reason for proceeding to the
areas in question.
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"My Gover1unent is confident that the Japanese Government cannot but concede that the infringement of and interference with American rights in China by the Japanese authorities involved in the situation to 'vhich attention is
herein brought are contrary to the repeated assurances of the
tT apanese Govern1nent that the American rights will be
respected; that the Japanese Government will take immediate steps, in keeping with such assurances, to cause the
return to their rightful owners of the premises of the University of Shanghai and other American property under
the occupation of Japanese armed forces; and that the
Japanese Govern1nent "rill issue instructions to have removed the obstacles jnterposed by the Japanese authorities
in China against return by An1erican nationals to places such
as those 1nentioned in the areas under Japanese military
occupation." (Press Releases, Vol. XVIII, No. 453.)

Airplctnes and pa.ct~fic blockade.-To date, there
has not been a pacifie blockade in \Vhich airplanes
\Vere emplo~yed, so that there are 110 precedents
strictly applicable to the situation of the Safa in
section (a) of this Situation. Applying the principles of maritime blocl{ade, it would seem legal
for the aircraft of state N to ask the Safa for
identification. To do that would 11ot be violating
the peace-ti1ne rights of state S which collld legally
object to any further step amollnting to visit and
search. If the Safa refuses to co1nply with the
request for identificatio11, 1nay the airplane use
force~ The treatises and precedents on this problem are exceedingly vague. In the view of the
third party i. e. state S, any employment of force,
eve11 to secure ide11tification, might seem to col1stitute an lln\varrantable interference \Vith its
peaceful rigl1ts. But the objective of the blocl{ading state must be l{ept in Inind, and if Ullidentified vessels \Vere allo\ved to pass the bloch:ade, the
entire n1easure of coercio11 n1ight be placed i11

70

FORCE I:N PEACE

jeopardy. It would be aski11g too much of the
blockading state to forego 1neasures of coercion
against the ships of third states n1 all cases where
identification could not be obtained. It does not
see1n UI1reasonable, therefore, to per1nit the applicatioll of force for the limited purpose of securing
identi(y. To support this assertion tl1ere is the
statement in Soule and ~IcCauley, "I11ternational
Law" page 50, ''That States not Parties to the Pacific Blockade * * * cannot complain because
they are required to establish their identity in the
ordinary manner.'' In the Naval War College
Situations, 1932, page 95, it is also asserted that
''The blockading force may take such measures as
are 11ecessary for closing the port befoTe which it
is n1aintaini11g a11 effective blockade.'' This last
state111ent is extremely broad, is liable to misinterpretation, and should not be taken as implying
any rights over third party ships other than tl1at
of identification.
In Situation (a), therefore, the aircraft has no
authority to order the freighter about if it has obtained identity. The conunand to lie to for 24 hours
or until a crt1iser of state N arrives to visit ancl
search the Safa, is absolutely unjustified. Even
were this a war-time situation, such tactics by an
airplane encountering a surface vessel 'vould appear to be illegal, as the discussion of Article 49 in
the Jurists Report indicates.
What are the rights of a surface blockading
squadron as against aircraft flying over a pacific
blockade~ ~Iuch the same type of reasonn1g is applicable here as that discussed imn1ediately above.
The Noan, the cruiser of stateN, havingtherightto
identify craft, acted legally in ordering the T-21 to
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land at a nearby airport in order that its identitY
and right to pass might be established. This involves deviation on the part of the airplane, but
such deviation of aircraft is essential as discussed
in Situation I. It is 11ot lawful for an airplane to
force a surface vessel to deviate, at least not yet, but
an aircraft or surface vessel meeting an aircraft
might well have to order deviation in order to effect
its lawful purpose. To the possible objection that
a blockade of the air maintained solely by sm"face
ships could not constitute an effective blockade, it
can be answered that surface vessels by their antiaircraft guns are capable of making passage overhead extremely dangerous. Such a situation was
definitely envisaged in Article 30 of the Jurists Report. In this case the fact that the J\T oan hit the
T-21 proves the effectiveness of the blockade in fact.
For stateN to allow the flight of tlnidentified airplanes over its blockade might well prove extremely risky and to ask a vessel of state N to
withhold fire in such cases \Vould not make sense.
The order of the Noan to the T-21 was not unreasonable. .Airplanes are difficult to identify in the
air, and military and commercial craft 11owadays
look very much alike. As the landi11g field was
11earby, no great inconvenience -vvas being asked
of the T-21 which should have complied with the
order. To the possible claim that the situation
'vas not sufficiently serious to \varrant the firing
upon a plane which in all likelihood wot1ld be
seriously damaged if hit, the answer is the same
as that given in Situation I. The pilot of the plane
took his chances and must suffer the consequences .
...t\_s \Vas stated i11 the case of U1~ited States v.
Diekel11~a1~ (92 U. S. 520), "She volt1ntarily as-
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sumed the risl{s of her hazardous enterprise and
must sustain the losses that follow * * *
(She) ought to have known they kept the port
closed to the exte11t necessary for the vigorotls
prosecution (of the "'\var). '' Therefore, assuming
that the Noa1L was really unaware of the T-21's
identity, a11d assuming further that a proper comInunications code was in effect (problem discussed
in Situation I) so that the T-21 could reasonably
be presun1ed to be aware of the sum1nons, the
i.I1itial firing by the N oan "'\Vas lawful. This decision is based upo11 the previously mentioned principle that the blockading state may make reasonable i11terference with the rights of third parties
for the attainment of its objective, the ter1n "reasonable'' being capable of interpretation in the
light of the facts of an actual situation.
The firing upo11 the T-21 after it had been forced
to land, 'vas not justified. It was an excessive use
of force 'vhich 'vas not 11ecessary for n1ilitary purposes, ancl the Taftt shot1ld take energetic steps to
protect the T-21 fron1 further damage. The rigl1t
of self-preservation is here brought into play.
Article 723 of U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.-The use of
force against a foreign and friendly state, or against anyone
'vithin the territories thereof, is illegal.
'rhe right of self-preservation, ho,Yever, is a right w·hich
belongs to states as "~en as to individuals, and in the case of
states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and its
possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against
arbitrary violence, actual or ilnpending, 'vhereby the state or
its citizens n1ay suffer irreparable injury. The conditions
calling for the application of the right of self-preservation
cannot be defined beforehand, but 1nust be left to the sound
jnd6rment of responsible officers, 'vho are to perform their
duties in this respect "·ith all possible care and forbearance.
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In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise
than as an application of the right of self-preservation as
above defined.
It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the
extent 'vhich is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end
required. It can never be exercjsed with a vie'v to inflicting
punishment for acts already com1nitted.

General ]Jf''i1~ciple i1tvolved.-It cannot be re-

peated too often that in non-war situatio11s of force
both the contestants and third states n1ust base
their actions upon the con1promise principle of
''reaso11able interference." The application of
this principle makes for the avoidance of controversy jn a realm where specific rules are almost
wholly absent. Though the laJinen may feel that
the bringing in of the word ''reasonable'' adds
little clarity, students of the law k110w that courts
and judges constantly have to deal with such matters as ''reasonable risl{'' and ''reasonable 1nan. ''
These words acquire definite meaning 'vhen employed in actual situations. They are legal tern1s
judicially interpreted. In International Situations like those here tlnder discussion, sensible 1nen
do not and "\vill not find it unduly difficult to decide what is "reasonable" when the legitimate
needs of the state engaging in force meets the
equally legitimate right of a third state under the
i11ternational law of peace. The principle 1nay
again be sumn1arized, this time in the words of
P·rofessor Ellery C. Stowell (International Law,
p. 555).
Quasi-neutrals must tolerate such modifications of the usual
relations as are reasonably necessary to apply the justifiable
1neasures of reprisal and to effect the legitimate purpose in
v1e''·
JG'iG33-40-6
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N on1n1"litary occupatio1~ and extrate1·r-itor-iality.-I11 the past there have been ma11y occtlpations
of territory wl1en no \var has been declared~ I11
occupations of this sort the ustlal rules regulating
a military occupant's co11dt1ct have been held to
apply. Tl1ough occupation, either "pacific" or
military is 111ore than il1vasion and gives to the
occt1pa11t certain rigl1ts incll1di11g that of securing
the obedience of tl1e local })Opulation, it does 11ot
operate to transfer title to the la11d involved, or to
terminate treaties. (See Note by Lester Woolsey,
Arnerica11 J ot1rnal of Inter11ational I_ja,v, April
1938, p. 319.)

A 1nerican attit1tde to1vard Japanese occn pat ion
of Chi1~a.-Follo\ving is the text of a letter fro1n
the Secretary of State to Senator William H.
Smathers:
18, 1937.
MY DEAR SENATOR Sl\IATHERS: I have received your letter
o£ December 13, 1937, in which you inform me that you
favor the ·withclra,val o£ A1nerican ships and citizens £ro1n
the area affected by the present conflict in the Far East.
The question o£ the types and degrees o£ protection 'vhich
this Governtnent should afford to its citizens abroad presents n1any difficulties and is one in regard to which opinions
1nay very readily differ. In a situation such as has prevailed
in the Far East there have been developed during 1nore than
a century certain rights, certain interests, certain obligations
and certain practices. In the light o£ peculiar features inherent in the situation, aJl o£ the lllajor po,Yers have developed and e1nployed, 'vith authorization by the Chinese Governinent, n1ethods for safeguarding the lives and interests
and property o£ their nationals believed to be appropriate
to the situation and 'varrantecl by the peculiarities thereof.
Thus, for instance, there caine about and there is still jn
existence the system o£ extraterritorial jurisdiction and various o£ its concomitants. Concurrentl~y, 1nany nationals of
this and other countries have, during seYeral generations,
DECE:\IBER
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gone to China, established themselves there in various occupations and activities, and subjected themselves both to the
advantages and to the disadvantages of the conditions prevailing there, and the American Government has, along with
other governments, accepted various rights and incurred various obligations. In a situation such as now prevails, many
of our nationals cannot suddenly disavo'v or cut themselves
off fro1n the past nor can the American Government suddenly
disavow its obligations and responsibilities. The American
naval vessels and the small contingents of American landed
forces which have been n1aintained in China were placed
and have been kept there solely for the purpose of assisting
in the maintenance of order and security as affecting the
lives, the property and the legitimate activities of American
nationals, especially in regard to conditions of local disorder
and unauthorized violence. These vessels and troops have
never had in any sense any mission of aggression. It has
long been the desire and expectation of the American Governn1ent that they shall be withdrawn when their appropriate function is no longer called for. 'Ve had thought a few
1nonths ago that the opportune moment for such a withdrawal was near at hand. The present, however, does not
see1n an opportune 1noment for effecting that withdrawal.
Officers of the . A. merican Government have repeatedly
and earnestly advised American citizens, in face of dangers
incident to residence in China, to withdraw and are making
every effort to provide safe rneans 'vhereby they may depart. During the current situation in China the American
1nilitary and naval forces have rendered important service
in protecting the lives of American nationals, in assisting in
evacuating Americans from areas of special danger, and in
1naking possible the n1aintenance of uninterrupted communications 'vith our nationals and our diplomatic and consular
establishments in the areas involved.
. A_s of possible interest in this connection there is enclosed
a press release issued by the Department on August 23,
1937, outlining the policy on which the Government is proceeding with reference to the situation in the Far East.
I am very grateful for your courtesy in bringing to my
attention your views in regard to the situation in the Far
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East, and I assure you that we welcon1e at all times
thoughtful vie,vs and comrnent on any phase of our foreign
relations.
Sincerely yours,
CoRDELL

HuLL.

(Press Releases, Vol. XVII, No. 430.)

At various tin1es during recent decades various powers,
an1ong 'vhich have been Japan and the United States, have
had occasion to con1municate and to confer with regard to
situations and problems in the Far East. In the conducting
of correspondence and of conferences relating to these Inatters, the parties involved have invariably taken into consideration past and present facts and they have not failed
to perceive the possibility and the desirability of changes in
the situation. In the making of treaties they have drawn
up and have agreed upon provisions intended to facilitate
advantageous developments and at the san1e time to obviate
and a vert the arising of friction bet,veen and among the
various po,vers which, having interests in the region or
regions under reference, were and 'vould be concerned.
In the light of these facts, and with reference especially to
the purpose and the character of the treaty provisions from
tilne to time solemnly agreed upon for the very definite purposes indicated,. the Government of the United States depreciates the fact that one of the parties to these agree1nents
has chosen to embark-as indicated both by action of its
agents and by official statements of its authorities-upon
a course directed to,vard the arbitrary creation by that
power by methods of its own selection, regardless of treaty
pledges and the established rights of other powers concerned,
of a "new order" in the Far East. "\Vhatever may be the
changes ""hich have taken place in the situation in the Far
East and whatever may be the situation now, these matters
are of no less interest and concern to the American Govern1nent than have been the situations which have prevailed
there in the past, and such changes as may henceforth take
place there, changes "~hich 1nay enter into the producing
of a "ne"" situation" and a "ne'v order," are and will be
of like concern to this Government. This Government is
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'vell aware that the situation has changed. This Government is also 'vell a ware that many of the changes have been
brought about by action. of Japan. This Government does
not admit, however, that there is need or 'varrant for any
one power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be
the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not
under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository
of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.
It is known to all the world that various of the parties to
treaties concluded for the purpose of regulating contacts
in the Far East and a voiding friction therein and there·
from-,vhich treaties contained, for those purposes, various
restrictive provisions-have from time to time and by processes of negotiation and agreement contributed, in the light
of changed situations, toward the removal of restrictions
and toward the bringing about of further developments
'vhich would 'varrant, in the light of further changes in the
situation, further re1novals of restrictions. By such methods
and processes, early restrictions ripon the tariff autonomy of
all countries in the Far East 'vere removed. By such methods and processes, the rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction once enjoyed by occidental countries in relations with
countries in the Far East have been given up in relations
with all of those countries except China; and in the years
immediately preceding and including the year 1931, countries 'vhich still possess those rights in China, including the
United States, were actively engaged in negotiations-far
advanced-looking to,vard surrender of those rights. All
discerning and impartial observers have realized that the
United States and other of the "treaty powers" have not
during recent decades clung tenaciously to their so-called
''special" rights and privileges in countries of the Far East
but on the contrary have steadily encouraged the development in those countries of institutions and practices in the
presence of which such rights and privileges may safely
and readily be given up; and all observers have seen those
rights and privileges gradually being surrendered voluntarily, through agreen1ent, by the pow'ers which have possessed them. On one point only has the Government of the
United States, along with several other governments, insisted: namely, that new situations must have developed to a
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point warranting the ren1oval of "speciaF' safeguarding
restrictions and that the ren1ovals be efi'ected by orderly
processes.
The Govern1nent of the United States has at all times regarded agree1nents as susceptible of alteration, but it has
always insisted that alterations can rightfully be made only
by orderly processes of negotiation and agreen1ent among
the parties thereto.
The Japanese Government has upon numerous occasions
expressed itself as holding si1nilar views.
The United States has in its international relations rights
and obligations which derive :fro1n international law and
rights and obligations which rest upon treaty provisions.
Of those which rest on treaty provisions, its rights and
obligations in and 'vith regard to China rest in part upon
provisions in treaties bet,,een the United States and China.
and in part upon provisions in treaties bet,,een the United
States and several other po,vers, including both China and
Japan. These treaties were concluded in good faith for the
purpose of safeguarding and pron1oting the interests not of
one only but of all of their signatories. The people and the
Govern1nent of the United States cannot assent to the abrogation of any of this country's rights or obligations by the
arbitrary action of agents or authorities of any other
country.
The Govern1nent o:f the United States has, however, always been prepared, and is now, to give due and ample
consideration to any proposals based on justice and reason
which envisage the resolving of proble1ns in a. n1anner duly
considerate of the rights and obligations o£ all parties directly concerned by processes of free negotiation and new
con11nitlnent by and among all of the parties so concerned.
There has been and there continues to be opportunity for
the Japanese Government to put for"~ard such proposals.
'I'his Government has been and it continues to be willing to
discuss such proposals, i:f and when put forward, with representatives of the other powers, including Japan and China,
whose rights and interests are involved, at whatever time
and in whatever place may be commonly agreed upon.
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11!eanwhile, this Government reserves all rights of the

United States as they exist and does not give a8sent to any
in1pairment of any of those rights.
JosEPH C. GREW.
(Note to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deceinber 31, 1938. Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 483.)

I desire also to call Your Excellency's attention to the
fact that unwarranted restrictions placed by the Japanese
military authorities upon American nationals in Chinanotwithstanding the existence of American treaty rights in
China and the repeated assurances of the Japanese Governlnent that steps had been taken which would insure that
_American nationals, interests, and properties would not be
subject to unlawful interference by Japanese authoritiesfurther subject American interests to continuing serious
inconvenience and hardship. R~ference is made especially
to the restrictions placed by the Japanese military upon
American nationals who desire to reenter and reocccupy
properties from which they have been driven by the hostilities and of which the Japanese military have been or still are
in occupation. Mention may also be made of the Japanese
censorship of and interference with American mail and telegrams at Shanghai, and of restrictions upon freedom of
trade, residence and travel by Americans, including the use
of railways, shipping, and other facilities. While Japanese
merchant vessels are carrying Japanese merchandise between
Shanghai and Nanking, those vessels decline to carry merchandise of other countries, and American and other nonJapanese shipping is excluded from the lower Yangtze on
the grounds of military necessity. Applications by American nationals for passes which would allow them to return
to certain areas in the lower Yangtze Valley have been
denied by the Japanese authorities on the ground that peace
and order have not been sufficiently restored, although many
Japanese merchants and their families are known to be in
those areas.
(From the American Note to Japan, October 6, 1938.
Press Releases, Vol. XIX, No. 474, p. 285.)
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"Fou""R. Concerning the return of American citizens to the
occupied areas, Your Excellency is aware that in North
China there is no restriction, excepting in very special cases
where the personal sn.Jety of those who return would be
endangered, while in the Yangtze Valley large numbers of
A1nericans have already returned. The reason why permission to return has not yet been made general is, as has been
· repeatedly communicated to Your Excellency, due to the
danger that persists because of the in1perfect restoration of
order and also to the impossibility of admitting nationals
of third po·wers on account of strategic necessities such as
the preservation of military secrets. Again, the various
restrictions enforced in the occupied areas concerning the
residence, travel, enterprise and trade of .A.1nerican citizens"
constitute the n1inimum regulations possible consistent with
1nilitary necessities and the local conditions of peace and
order. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to
restore the situation to nor1nal as soon as circumstances
permit.
"FrYE. The Japanese Govern1nent were surprised at the
allegation that there exists a fundamental difference between
the treatment accorded to Japanese in America and the
treatment accorded to Americans in Japan. "While it is
true that in these days of e1nergency Americans residing in
this country are subject to various econon1ic restrictions, yet
these are, needless to say, restrictions imposed not upon
Americans alone but also on all foreigners of all nationalities
as well as upon the subjects of Japan. I beg to reserve for
another occasion a statement of the views of the Japanese
Government concerning the treatment of Japanese subjects
in .A.1nerican territory, referred to in Your Excellency's note.
".A. s has been explained above, the Japanese Government,
with every intention of fully respecting A1nerican rights
and interests in China, have been doing all that could possibly be done in that behalf. However, since there are in
progress at present in 0 hina military operations on a scale
unprecedented in our historYt, it may well be recognized by
the Government of the United States that it is unavoidable
that these military operations should occasionally present
obstacles to giving full effect to our intention of respecting
the rights and interests of American citizens.''
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(:E"ro1n the Japanese reply, Nove1nber 18, 1938, to the
preceding note. Press Releases, 'Tol. XIX, No. 477, p. 352.)

Rules of (( tJacific'' occu pa.tio1~.-As \vith measures of force short of \Var in general, very few
specific regulations exist concer11ing "pacific" ocCllpation, but certai11 lines of conduct emerge from
an analysis of past 1neasures of this sort :
( 1) The coerced state retains title to the territory occupied and no legal change in sovereignty
occurs withollt a definite treaty or without the
'vorkings of the principle of prescription.
(2) The occupant in his jurisdiction is limited
to the right of garriso11 and of securing the safety
of his troops on the territory occupied. This is
fairly extensive jllrisdiction, however, for naturally the occllpying authorities in looking after
the security of their troops will have to assume a
large measure of control.
The problem, then, is to balance the il1terests
involved, those of the occupant against those of
third states and of the occupied state. As with
military occupation, the local rules should continue
in force ''as far as possible,'' that is, as far as the
safety of the military forces allo,vs. This state of
affairs is prescribed by Article 48 of Hague Convention IV, of 1907, Respecti11g the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and i11 Article VI of the
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field (1863), which reads:
All civil and penal law shall continue to take its course
* * * under martial la'v * * * unless * * *
stopped by order of the occupying 1nilitary po,ver.

In an occupied area there are thus two parallel
legal systen1s. The occupant applies his own law
in all cases of cri1ne co1nmitted by his own officers
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and men, in all cases of crimes against the army
of occupation by any one in t~e area, and in all
cases of \var crimes involving illegal attempts to
interrupt lines of communication, to demolish
bridges, to obstruct traffic, etc. The primordial
right of self-protection gives the occupant this necessary jurisdiction. In an exhaustive treatise,
"Des Occupations Militaires en dehors Occupations de Guerre'' (Paris, 1913) by RaYJ-nond Robin,
will be found a complete survey of the problems
involved in "pacific" occupation.
(3) When the two jurisdictions come into collision, that of the occupant necessarily has priority.
This conclusion is based upon the practice followed
in the pre-war instances of occupation. In many
of these,. the occupying power clashed with the
rights of third states established in extraterritoriality conventions. The occupant in each instance
gave consideration to the stipulations of these
treaties, but at certain times felt obliged because of
military requirements to override the treaty rights.
The occupation in itself, it should be remembered,
did not abrogate these treaties which remained in
force llntil arranged for by further negotiation.
Occ·upat-iort and extrate1~ritoriality - P1~ece
det~ts.-The French in Morocco in 1907 declared
"the fact of occupation can11ot modify in any manner the rules of procedure established by
treaty, * * * at least in regard to infractions
which do 1tot directly co1tcer1t the security of the
occ-upying troops.'' (Robin op. cit., p. 546.) The
famous Casablanca arbitration of 1909 involved a
conflict between French troops and the German
consular regime. Though the arbitral court rendered a Solomon-like a"\vard which e11deavored to
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placate both pa1·ties, the result really was favorable
to the French whose military needs were recognized
as taking precedence over all others. The court
stated that it vvas \vrong for the German Consul not
to recognizethe rights of exclusive jurisdiction which appertain to the
occupying state in foreign territory, as 'veil as in countries
under capitulations, as regards the soldiers of the army of
occupation, and the actions whatever they may be or from
·wherever they 1nay con1e ''hich are of a nature to compromise
its safety. (Deserters at Casablanca, G. G. Wilson, "The
Hague Arbitration" Cases, p. 91.)

Likewise i11 the occupation of Tunis in 1881, the
French tried some Italians who were urging vio'Jence in the military courts and refused to turn
then1 over to the Italian c9nsul who, the French
alleged, would free them. (Robin op. cit., p. 671.)
·During the occupation of Crete by an international
army in 1897, the 1nilitary commanders were given
complete jurisdiction over all offenses against the
army, and Great Britain proclaimed the same rtlle
\vhen Cyprus was occupied in 1878. An American
was held u11der Frencl1 military jurisdiction in
::Niadagascar in 1895, despite the provisions of the
1881 consular treaty between the United States and
:J!Iadagascar. A final example of this rule of priority for the occupying forces is to be found in Bis111arck's instructions to the German Consul in
Samoa i11 1889 when he declared that the occupant
had the right to defend himself by force against
any threat to his safety. As sun1med up by Robin
(ibid., p. 670) "In Capitulatio11s colmtries, the
111ilitary jurisdiction is competent for all attacks on
the security of the ar1ny of occupatio11."
Applicatio1~ to the proble1n.-Though the forces
of state N have occupied a large slice of state ~I,
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the fundan1ental juridical status of the area l1as not
changed. Titles still belong tq state M and the
extraterritoriality treaty between state M and state
T is still in force. The local la,vs of state T reI11ain in effect i11sofar as they are not inconsistent
'vith the military needs of state ~I. The latter's
rule is primary in all matters affecting the safety
of its troops. If the nationals of state T had committed a crime or an act against the occupant, there
'vould be 110 dot1bt as to the correctness of state N's
position were that power to try the nationals in its
military courts. In the problem presented, however, the nationals concerned are accused of crime
against citizens of state M and thus 'vould seem to
be eligible for trial by their own consul under the
treaty, the security of N's forces apparently not
being involved. It is a jurisdictional dispute which
ought to be a 1natter of negotiation between states
T a11d N. It is therefore pri1narily a diplomatic
a11d not a naval problem.
The Commander of the Tat~~ shot1ld remain close
at hand, keeping in touch with the situation, and
should notify the consul that he is ready to give
protectio11 if the lives of the state T nationals are
placed in jeopardy. He should not issue a11y provocative demands upon the N authorities. The
situatio11 does not warrant such a drastic step
which might involve state T in a difficult and embarrassing episode. Naval con1ma11ders should
deal with local autl1orities through their own accredited consular and dipiomatic re1)resentatives,
and should threaten or use force in foreign countries only as a last resort dictated by the den1ands
of self-defense.
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On occasions " rhere injury to the United States or to citi·
zens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the
principles of international la'v or treaty rights, the comInander in chief shall consult 'vith the diplomatic representa.
tive or consul of the United States, and take such steps as
the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to
the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. ,._I'he responsibility
for any action taken by a naval force, ho,vever, rests wholly
upon the con11nanding officer thereof. (U. S. Navy Regulations, Rule 722.)

Resu1ne.-"'\!Vhen states employ force against one
another i11 time of peace, whether such measures
be called reprisals or son1ething else, international
law is cOilfronted 'vith one of its most serious and
difficult problen1s. The laws of war and neutrality
cannot be Inade to apply in their entirety because
tech11ically a state of peace still reigns. The peace
is a disturbed one, hovvever, the contestants taking
on son1e of the aspects of belligerents and third
states becon1ing in reality qt1asi-neutrals. The
ter111inology is apt to be very confusing becat1se the
legal situation itself is so muddled. The problems
arise as a restilt of the absence of an organized
international government vvhich would decide questioi1S of damages, and which wotlld supervise law
enforce1ne11t. Due to the lack of such a governInent, states have been in the habit of taking the
law into their own hands under the theory of ''self-l:lelp" \vhich permits coercion \Vhen legally an injury has been received. In practice, the Great
Powers, the only states vvhich had effective force
at their disposal, have abused the theory and have
engaged in 111easures short of war against weaker
nations ostensibly under the gt1ise of law enforcement, but actually for political ends.
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The weaker powers in such situations have usually 11ot cared or been able to regard st1ch measures as i11stituting a legal state of war. .As a result, considerable practice has accumulated involving the procedures and tactics followed i11
these "force i11 peace" relationships. Unable to
co11trol the political use of force, international
lawyers have accepted the practice and have formtllated a few rules governing the de facto use of
force. Since the framing of the League of N atioi1S Covena11t and the ratificatio11 of the Pact of
Paris (Kellogg-Bria11d Treaty) the problem has
continued to be an acute one. States using
n1ilitary and naval force agai11st other powers
have been reluctant to tern1 their actions ''war''
because such a declaration wo11ld seem to identify
them as violators of treaties which renounced or
put restrictions upon the goi11g to war. Since 1920
the only occasion upon which a participant in an
international struggle has admitted that war was
in progress was in 1933 whe11 on ~Iay lOth of that
year Paraguay formally declared "\var on Bolivia.
None of the actual contestants in tl1e Si11o-Japa11ese or the Italo-Ethiopian co1Iflicts has admitted
a war status, though during the latter embroglio
the .American President ''found'' a war and most
of the men1bers of the League decided that Italy
had "resorted to war'' in violation of the Covenant.
Governing these non-war sitt1ations there is very
little in the \vay of specific rules. Certain general
principles, bo\vever, are applicable, and though
these may seem inconsistent with the laws of peace
and not in harn1on~y with what many may regarrl
as tl1e proper ends of law, they must be accepted
for tl1e time being for lac}{ of anything better. The
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1nost in1portant of these general principles is that
'vhich specifies that the state employing force may
interfere with the rights of third states to an extent reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the military or naval objective. Quasi-neutrals
1nust accept some inco11Venie11Ce. Examples of this
11ecessary compromise bet\veeil the interests of the
force-employing state and third parties is the right
of the foTmer to identify all vessels and aircraft
crossing a pacific blockade and the further right
to use force to supple1nent this right of idei1tification. Such an adjustn1ent affords the blockading
state an adequate opportunity to pursue its objective and yet does not accord it the co1nplete belligerent rights of visit and search. A state using such
1neasures cannot expect all the advantages of belligere11cy if it is unwilling to assume its obligations.
The Tight of identification is a reasonable con1pr0111ise for a non-war operation.
In military occupation on land, when no \var
~tatliS exists, a similar balancing of interests is possible. The occupant inevitably has priority in all
matteTs relating to the security of its forces, but
such rights do not include a termination of treaties
or a complete suppression of the local laws. The
guiding word in all this is ''reasonable'' which,
though vague in the abstract, is capable of sensible
i11terpretation in actual situations.
SOLUTION

(a) If the airplane is still with the Safa, the
co1nmander of the Sogu should direct the Safa to
lie to, should proceed to the Safa to protect it, and
should notify the commander of the N forces that
the Safa is a vessel of state S and is 11ot to be
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molested, identificatio11 bei11g all that the Safct is
legally required to ft1r11isll the_airplane. If the
airpla11e has left the Safa, the Sog,z~ should direct
the latter to proceed into the port, and, if deemed
esse11tial for the protectio11 of the Safa, tl1e Sogn
should accon1pa11y it i11to the port.
(b) The comma11der of the Tafu should 'var11
the N oan that if tl1e latter continues to fire tlpOll
the T-21, he 'vill fire 11pon the N oa,n to force it to
desist. He should attempt to interpose the Tafu
bet,veen the J\T oan and the airpla11e vvitl1 the object
of halting the firing and shottld send out a sn1all
boat to rescue the sttrvivors of the T-21.
(c) The commander of the ~Paft~ should consult
'vith the co11sul of state T at ~iottnt a11d shottld
report the i11cident to his sttperiors i11 the Navy
De1Jartme11t. A demand for the return of the
nationals of state T or a threat of the 11se of force
on tl1e part of the co1nn1ander of the Ta{n 'vould
not be vvarranted by tl1e facts of this situation. As
long as 110 immediate threat to the lives a11d pro1J:.
erty of state T 11atio11als is involved, the 111atter is
one for diplomatic 11egotiation bet,vee11 states T
a11d N.

